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BOOK REVIEW
HOW RADICAL IS LANI GUINIER?
THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY:
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
By Lani Guinier.
The Free Press, New York, 1994.
Pp. xx, 324. $24.95.
Reviewed by Michael E. Lewyn*
INTRODUCTION
On April 29, 1993, President Clinton nominated Lani Guinier, a profes-
sor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, to head the Justice
Department's Civil Rights Division.'
Because the Civil Rights Division is responsible for enforcing the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965,2 the central topic of debate surrounding Guinier's
nomination quickly became her assertions in numerous law review arti-
cles that even if racial minorities achieve proportional representation in
state and local legislatures, they still may be inadequately represented if
their legislators are consistently outvoted by whites.' To remedy the
problem of ineffective minority representation, Guinier had suggested in
her writings that under certain circumstances, minorities receive veto
* Attorney, Washington, D.C. Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Miami
School of Law (1992-94). B.A., Wesleyan University; J.D., University of
Pennsylvania Law School. Former law clerk to the Hon. Theodore McMillian (8th
Cir.) and the Hon. Morris S. Arnold (W.D. Ark., elevated to 8th Cir.). I would like to
thank Thomas Robinson for his helpful comments. Any errors of fact, logic, or
judgment are mine alone.
I Michael Isikoff, Clinton Nominates 7 to Justice, WASH. POST, April 30, 1993, at
A20.
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973, 1973a to 1973bb-4 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
3 See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A
Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1589 (1993); Lani Guinier, Keeping
the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393
(1989); Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA.
L. REV. 1413 (1991); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act
and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 1077 (1991). Because
Guinier's book incorporates the substance of all these articles in some form, for con-
venience all future cites will be to the book rather than the articles.
927
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:927
power over "critical minority issues, ' and that minority legislators be
granted additional voting power through a "cumulative voting" system,
which would give them extra votes on issues that they care about.5
Guinier's views touched off a blizzard of protest from political conserv-
atives and moderates. A Wall Street Journal headline called Guinier one
of "Clinton's Quota Queens,"6 while Senate Minority Leader Robert
Dole described Guinier as a "consistent supporter, not only of quotas, but
of vote-rigging schemes that make quotas look mild."7 Faced with enor-
mous public and congressional opposition, President Clinton withdrew
Guinier's nomination on June 3, 1993.8
In order to "spark the debate that was denied"9 when President Clin-
ton withdrew her nomination, as well as to prove that her ideas "are not
undemocratic or out of the mainstream,"'" Guinier has published her
articles in book form. This Review examines Guinier's ideas about elec-
tion law, with a particular emphasis on her proposals for reforming rules
governing legislative elections and rules governing legislative
decisionmaking.
I. BACKGROUND, OR WHAT THE Fuss WAS ABOUT
A. The Three Generations of Voting Rights Law
According to Guinier, voting rights law has passed through "three gen-
erations."" The first generation "focused directly on access to the ballot
on the assumption [that] the right to vote by itself is 'preservative of other
rights,' ,12 and included the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the "1965 Act").
The 1965 Act "outlawed literacy tests, brought federal registrars to trou-
bled districts to ensure safe access to polls, and targeted for federal
administrative review many local registration procedures."'" As a result,
"[t]he number of blacks registered to vote rose dramatically within five
4 LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 108 (1994).
5 Id. Guinier also supports cumulative voting in legislative elections. Id. at 14-16.
By most accounts, cumulative voting in elections is far less controversial than cumula-
tive voting within a legislature. See id. at 15 (noting that the Reagan and Bush
Administrations both approved cumulative voting in local elections).
6 Clint Bolick, Clinton's Quota Queens, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1993, at A12.
7 Michael Isikoff, Confirmation Battle Looms Over Guinier, WASH. POST, May 21,
1993, at A23.
8 Ruth Marcus, Clinton Withdraws Nomination of Guinier, WASH. POST, June 4,
1993, at Al (reporting that President Clinton decided to withdraw Guinier's nomina-
tion after "[h]aving studied her articles in detail for the first time" the day before).
9 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 19.
10 Id. at 9.
11 Id. at 7.
12 Id. at 19.
'3 Id.: see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971. 1973, 1973a to 1973bb-4.
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years after passage. "14
Despite the early success of the 1965 Act, Guinier argues that the rights
that it bestowed failed to give blacks equal access to political power.
After Congress passed the 1965 Act, many southern states simply altered
election rules in order to limit black influence. Guinier states that "[b]y
changing, for example, from neighborhood-based districts to jurisdiction-
wide at-large representatives, those in power ensured that although
blacks could vote, and even run for office, they could not win."
' 15
Second-generation voting-rights activists sought to combat at-large
elections and similar vote-diluting processes through litigation aimed at
making black votes more meaningful. For example, second-generation
activists worked to elect more black officials, "primarily by creating
majority-black single-member districts."' 6 Initially, second-generation
lawsuits were resisted by the Supreme Court. For example, in City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 7 the Court' held that an at-large voting system in
Mobile, Alabama could not be found illegal or unconstitutional unless the
plaintiffs could demonstrate that the politicians who created or main-
tained the system intended to discriminate against racial minorities. 18
In response to the Bolden decision, a broad coalition of civil rights
activists "urged Congress to amend the [1965 Act] to specify that discrim-
inatory results alone would establish a violation."' 9 Congress answered
in 1982 by adding such a second-generation voting rights provision to sec-
tion two of the 1965 Act.20 As amended, section two eliminates the "dis-
criminatory intent" test that the Supreme Court articulated in Bolden,
14 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 19.
15 Id. Guinier defines racial polarization as "the degree to which blacks and whites
vote differently." Id. at 138. Assuming a racially polarized electorate unevenly
divided among ethnic groups, an at-large system will elect only those candidates
favored by the majority, whereas a district system will elect some majority candidates
and some minority candidates. For example, suppose city X is 59% white and has
racially polarized elections for its six-member city council. If seats on the council are
elected on an at-large basis, each member of the "white" slate will receive approxi-
mately 59% of the vote, and all six council members will be white. On the other
hand, if the elections are held in neighborhood-based districts, the black neighbor-
hoods will likely be able to elect one or two council members to represent them. Of
course, this scenario applies with any two polarized groups, not just racial ones; for
instance, at-large elections might exclude Republicans in cities dominated by Demo-
crats, and vice versa.
16 Id. at 50. Single-member districts are districts that elect one representative to a
legislative body. In such districts, the one candidate who gets the most votes wins.
Thus, single-member districting is a "winner-take-all voting" system.
17 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
18 Id. at 66.
19 GUINER, supra note 4, at 26.
20 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131,
134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988)).
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and provides instead that voting rights violations "[can] be proved based
on discriminatory results alone."'" Under section two's "results test," the
"absence of black elected officials is circumstantial evidence ... of dis-
criminatory results,"22 whereas "roughly proportional black representa-
tion legitimate[s] the electoral process."2 In keeping with section two's
emphasis on making the black vote more meaningful, the classic second-
generation remedy under section two is a redistricting plan that gives
minorities proportional representation through the creation of single-
member "majority-minority" districts.24
To avoid section two liability, or to remedy section two violations, poli-
ticians have enacted districting plans designed to increase the number of
black legislators by herding black voters into overwhelmingly black sin-
gle-member districts. In North Carolina, for example, the state legisla-
ture designed a black-majority congressional district that traces the
narrow path of Interstate 85, "creating a swatch of voters on either side of
the highway from one end of the state to another. ' 25 Similarly, Illinois
legislators created a congressional district shaped like an earmuff, con-
necting two non-contiguous Latino neighborhoods in Chicago in order to
establish a Latino-majority district.2"
This type of race-conscious districting, as encouraged by section two,
has been attacked from all directions for focusing too closely on race.
The Wall Street Journal, for example, described minority-dominated dis-
tricts as "rigged by race, '"27 while the Almanac of American Politics, in its
description of North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District, stated
that such districting "amount[s] to a form of apartheid.," 8 Indeed, even
Guinier criticizes race-conscious districting because it does not necessar-
21 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 50; see 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
22 GuINIER, supra note 4, at 50; see 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
23 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 53; see 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
24 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 53.
25 Id. at 120. In Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), the Supreme Court held that
the North Carolina plan that created the State's elongated Twelfth Congressional Dis-
trict would be unconstitutional absent: (1) a demonstration of a legitimate non-racial
justification; and (2) a finding that the plan was sufficiently "narrowly tailored to fur-
ther a compelling state interest." Id. at 2828, 2832. The Court specifically avoided
deciding whether " 'the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without
more[,]' always gives rise to an equal protection claim," id. at 2828 (quoting id. at
2839 (White, J., dissenting)), and therefore offered no explanation of how to distin-
guish legitimate race-conscious redistricting plans from unconstitutional ones.
26 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 120.
27 Id. (quoting Jim Sleeper, Rigging the Vote by Race, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1992, at
A14).
28 MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS
969 (1994 ed.); see also ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES CoUT? 192-231
(1987) (contending that by focusing on group rights to proportional officeholding
instead of procedural fairness, "confused" courts interpreting § 2 have tended to go to
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ily guarantee minorities the political equality they seek. Guinier reasons
that the ability to elect a proportionate number of minorities does not
necessarily ensure political influence within a legislative body.2" Accord-
ingly, she argues for a "third generation" of legislation and litigation "to
police the legislative voting rules whereby a majority consistently rigs the
process to exclude a minority."3 In short, Guinier's belief that section
two did not go far enough makes it unsurprising that her nomination
stirred so much controversy.
B. What Guinier's Job Would Have Been
The Justice Department's Civil Rights Division has considerable influ-
ence over voting rights law. Section five of the 1965 Act3' includes what
is known as the "preclearance" provision. This provision requires "cov-
ered jurisdictions" 2 to "submit all proposed changes in electoral rules or
procedures to the U.S. Attorney General or the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia."33 These proposed changes, which include not
only "state rules prescribing who may register to vote,"3 4 but also "any
state enactment which altered the election law of a covered state in even
a minor way,""5 may not be implemented until the Attorney General or
the court has determined that the proposed changes are non-discrimina-
tory.36 Because most southern states and portions of numerous others
qualify as "covered jurisdictions, 37 and because ongoing redistricting is
necessary to comply with the "one person, one vote" principle,3" the
the unnecessary and unintended extreme of guaranteeing racial minorities the right to
win elections).
29 See GUINIER, supra note 4, at 54-70 (discussing the inadequacies of second-gen-
eration voting rights law).
30 Id. at 8. In Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992), the first
case that Guinier categorizes as addressing third-generation concerns, the Supreme
Court declined to interpret changes restricting the powers of black county commis-
sioners as diminishing the right of blacks to vote in general elections. Id. at 829.
31 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
32 "Covered jurisdictions" are those which: (1) have employed voter registration
tests requiring proof of education level, moral quality, or standing in the community;
and (2) have had unusually low voter registration or turnout. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(b).
33 Dale Krane, Implementation of the Voting Rights Act: Enforcement by the
Department of Justice, in THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT 123, 124 (Lorn S. Foster ed.,
1985); see 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
34 Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 827.
35 Id. at 827-28 (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566 (1969)).
36 Krane, supra note 33, at 124; see 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
37 Krane, supra note 33, at 124-25.
38 The "one person, one vote" doctrine has evolved from Justice Stewart's recogni-
tion in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 382 (1963), that "[wlithin a given constituency,
there can be room for but a single constitutional rule-one voter, one vote." Id. at
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preclearance provision gives the head of the Civil Rights Division a vir-
tual veto power over the constant redistricting and formation of other
election-related rules in an area of more than 1,000,000 square miles, con-
taining a population of over 50 million people, more than 1000 counties,
and several thousand municipalities."9
II. GUINIER ON VOTING RIGHTS
In the introduction to The Tyranny of the Majority, Guinier lays out her
basic thesis: Elections are fair only if minorities40 also have some influ-
ence over public policy. Thus, majority rule is fair only if it is the "rule of
shifting majorities, [whereby] the losers at one time or on one issue join
with others and become part of the governing coalition at another time or
on another issue."4 Unless the rule of shifting majorities takes hold, the
majority effectively becomes a "permanent majority" that will be tempted
to abuse its power.4" This may in turn lead to instability, because it leaves
minority voters without any incentive to participate in such a system and
instead tempts them to overthrow it.
43
To eliminate this problem, Guinier recommends that under certain cir-
cumstances, winner-take-all majority rule be replaced by a system that
promotes "consensus and positive-sum solutions., 44 Specifically, Guinier
concludes that: (1) race-conscious districting under section two is prefera-
ble to race-neutral districting, because it provides greater assurance that
minorities will be represented in legislatures;45 (2) race-conscious district-
ing under section two, although preferable to the status quo ante, is inad-
equate to ensure adequate minority representation for a variety of
reasons;46 and (3) within some legislative bodies, majority rule should be
altered because even where ethnic minorities are proportionately repre-
382 (Stewart, J., concurring). Article I, § 2 of the Constitution requires decennial
apportionment of federal congressional districts, and the Equal Protection Clause
requires that "representation in a state legislature ... be clearly based upon popula-
tion unless a legitimate state objective demands otherwise," LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-3 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964)).
39 Krane, supra note 33, at 125.
40 Congress enacted the 1965 Act to protect racial minorities, and thus Guinier
focuses on protection of racial minorities. However, she recognizes that majority rule
may be unfair if "any significant group of people ends up as permanent losers."
GUINIER, supra note 4, at 9.
41 Id. at 4.
42 Id. at 9.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 20.
45 Id. at 72.
46 Id. at 73.
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sented in legislative bodies, they have little political power if they are
usually outvoted by white legislators.
I will address each of these issues in turn.
A. Why Guinier Supports Race-Conscious Districting
The American electoral system was adapted from the pre-1832 British
system,47 which emphasized land as the basis of political representation.4"
This type of geographic districting "assumes that each voter is a 'mem-
ber' of a 'group' comprised of all the voters in [the] district."49 In many
ways, however, America has outgrown this system: As greater numbers of
people within a geographic district have gained the right to participate
politically, the diversity of views in those districts have reduced the
importance of geography as a proxy for shared interests.
In response to this problem, Guinier suggests that if districting can be
based on geography, it can also be based on a mixture of geography and
race-a combination that by definition guides race-conscious redistricting
under section two. Guinier reasons as follows:
(1) Historically, the rationale for geographic redistricting has been that
people who live in the same area have common interests.50
(2) Just as people who live near each other have common interests,
people of the same racial background also have common interests
because "[riace in this country has defined individual identities, opportu-
nities, frames of reference, and relationships."'" Thus, race, like geogra-
phy, "serves as a political proxy for shared experience and common
interests. 52
(3) Race, like geography, is therefore relevant to voters' interests, and
can accordingly help legislators create districts containing voters with
common interests.
In arriving at this conclusion, Guinier rebuts some of the arguments
against second-generation race-conscious districting. One such argument
is that because "the right to vote is individual, not group-based," minori-
ties are adequately represented "as long as individual minority group
members have a fair chance to participate formally by voting."5" Guinier
rejects this argument for two reasons. First, she notes that geography,
like race, lumps voters into groups based on interests. Thus, race-con-
47 Id. at 127.
48 Id. at 128.
49 Id. at 127.
50 Id. at 127-29; see also Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2826 (1993) (acknowledging
that the geographic "compactness" of an electoral district may be a legitimate state
interest).
51 GuINIER, supra note 4, at 137.
52 Id. Guinier acknowledges that race is a "useful but limited proxy," but reserves
her strongest support for interest-based representation. Id. at 127.
53 Id. at 139.
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scious districting is no more "group-based" than geography-conscious dis-
tricting.54 Second, people vote not merely to express themselves, but also
to affect public policy. 5 Because a single voter cannot affect public pol-
icy unless other voters have similar preferences, the right to "participate
politically" "is a right best realized in association with other individuals,
i.e., as a group."56 Thus, voting involves group as well as individual
interests.
Next, she addresses the argument that "since whites can, and do, repre-
sent black voters, blacks should pursue instead an 'integrative' electoral
strategy in which white politicians compete for black votes" in majority-
white districts.5 Guinier responds that where voters are racially
polarized, politicians may be unable to satisfy both white and black
demands,58 and will therefore have to ignore black views in order to be
elected.59 In such situations, black interests will receive consideration
only in majority black districts. Guinier also observes that even white
politicians who compete for minority votes do not generally always take
minority demands seriously.
60
Third, she rebuts the argument that geography is a more effective polit-
ical proxy than race because geography, "unlike race, is temporal, indi-
vidualistic, and discretionary.",6 ' Guinier responds that residence in a
district is no more voluntary than race because "the one-person, one-vote
rule mandates continual redistricting," and because "existing district con-
figurations" are temporary.62 Even if redistricting does not affect most
voters, "very few people move somewhere in recognition of their likely
voting efficacy within particular election subdistricts ... [or even] know in
advance the particular elected officials by whom they are likely to be rep-
resented., 63 Furthermore, geography "reflects the very essence of limita-
54 Id. at 140.
55 Id. at 134.
56 Id. at 125.
57 Id. at 36.
58 For example, if whites want most government services to be given to white
neighborhoods and blacks want most government services to be given to black neigh-
borhoods, a politician will have difficulty pleasing both groups. If either group consti-
tutes a stable majority of the electorate, politicians have a strong incentive to heed
majority demands and ignore the minority.
59 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 37. Indeed, a districting plan violates § 2 only when
the electorate is racially polarized. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51
(1986) (holding that multimember districts operate to impair minority voters' ability
to elect representatives only when the minority group is politically cohesive and the
white majority votes as a bloc frequently enough to enable it to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate).
60 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 37.
61 Id. at 141.
62 Id. at 129.
63 Id.
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tions on choice based on group identity," because "residential ghettoes
are often the result of racial discrimination."64
In dismissing the "voluntary district" argument, Guinier fails to point
out that for geographically mobile citizens, the very temporariness of
geography makes it irrelevant to a voter's interests. For example, if a
voter moves back and forth between a city and its suburbs, the circum-
stance of residency in a city as opposed to a suburb cannot be said to
provide an observer with any insight into the voter's political preference.
Fourth, Guinier rejects the argument that "[r]acial gerrymandering,
even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial fac-
tions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in
which race no longer matters. ' 65 Guinier responds that "in a racially
polarized environment, the process of districting is inevitably race-con-
scious."66 She admits that race-conscious districting is to some extent
divisive,67 but adds that "those who take issue with current approaches
have a responsibility not just to criticize but to propose alternative solu-
tions that protect the right of the minority to have its voice represented
and heard in the legislative debate., 6 As noted above, Guinier believes
that districting merely on the basis of geography does not protect this
right, because in a racially polarized area, only a majority-black district
will give blacks a voice.69
B. Why Guinier Prefers Cumulative Voting to the Status Quo
Although Guinier prefers the status quo to race-neutral redistricting,
she contends that race-conscious districting fails to represent all voters'
interests adequately. Specifically, she posits that any form of single-mem-
ber districting-whether it is race-neutral or race-conscious-wastes
most citizens' votes, and that single-member districts should under some
circumstances be replaced with what she calls "interest representation.,
70
Interest representation is based not on involuntary and fixed territorial
constituencies, but rather on representing voters through their "self-iden-
tified interests."'' As a practical matter, "interest representation" means
replacing geographic districting with a modified at-large system known as
64 Id. at 141.
65 Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993).
66 GuINIER, supra note 4, at 265 n.2.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 274 n.53.
69 Guinier also notes that "in light of recent [riots] in Los Angeles, concerns about
unnecessarily dividing society do not seem consistent with the divided society in which
we already find ourselves." Id. Because race-conscious districting has been the law
for a decade, I find this statement quite puzzling.
70 Id. at 94.
71 Id.
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"cumulative voting." In this section, I will discuss: (1) Guinier's criticisms
of single-member districting; and (2) cumulative voting.
1. What's Wrong With Single-Member Districts?
For Guinier, the touchstone of the ideal electoral system is what she
calls the "one-vote, one-value" principle.72 Guinier's one-vote, one-value
principle comes from a conception of political fairness in which "as many
votes as possible should count in the election of representatives."7 " Sin-
gle-member districting fails to satisfy the one-vote, one-value principle
because it "wastes votes of both individuals and groups ... [by making]
certain that there are political losers in each district."74 For example,
white voters in a largely black district, or black voters in a largely white
district, frequently "waste" their votes by voting for the losing candidate.
Race-conscious districting thus gives black voters influence in "black"
districts, but does nothing for other black voters.75
Although packing voters into homogeneous districts reduces "vote-
wasting" by supporters of losing candidates, such districting wastes votes
in other ways. As Guinier sees it:
When more people vote for the winning candidate than is technically
necessary to carry the district, their votes are technically wasted
because they were unnecessary to provide an electoral margin within
the district and because they could have been used to provide the
necessary electoral margin for a like-minded partisan in another
district.76
Guinier also notes that where single-member districts exist,
political or racial partisans ... may be inclined to gerrymander, i.e.,
pack the minority party or minority race into a few districts to dimin-
ish their overall influence. Or they may fracture the likely support-
ers of the minority party or minority race, spreading out their votes
among a number of districts and ensuring that they do not comprise
an electoral majority in any district.77
Gerrymandering also increases the number of "safe," politically non-
competitive districts, which in turn reduces voter interest and voter turn-
out and wastes votes by ensuring that most elections are not close.78
72 Id. at 122.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 134.
75 Id. at 135.
76 Id. at 134.
77 Id. at 136.
73 Id. at 85. Guinier also suggests that single-member districting generally reduces
voter turnout by "emphasizing individual candidacies rather than interests." Id. at 83.
Guinier explains that multimember districts force candidates to develop substantive
initiatives to mobilize voter interest, because candidate success depends on high voter
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Indeed, gerrymandering may allow incumbent politicians to "re-elect
themselves" by creating "packed, safe" districts that will consistently re-
elect them.79
Finally, Guinier notes that race-conscious single-member districts fail
to solve the problem of minority underrepresentation in places where
minorities are dispersed widely throughout a given jurisdiction and there-
fore cannot constitute a majority in any district."0
In short, Guinier argues that any form of single-member districting
wastes votes, encourages gerrymandering, and reduces political competi-
tion. Thus, she favors replacing single-member districting with "cumula-
tive voting," in which "voluntary minority interest constituencies could
choose to cumulate their votes to express the intensity of their distinctive
group interests."'
2. Cumulative Voting
Under a cumulative voting system, candidates run jurisdiction-wide.
Each voter gets the same number of votes as there are seats up for elec-
tion, and could distribute these votes among candidates. Thus, in a city
with a four-member city council elected on an at-large basis, each voter
would have four votes. The voters could cast all four votes for their
favorite, or could register one or more votes for each of several candi-
dates. All candidates who received more than twenty percent of the vote
would be elected automatically, although a candidate could win with less
than twenty percent of the vote. 2 Local governments occasionally use
cumulative voting, 3 and the majority of states either permit or require
turnout. This process may heighten the differences among candidates on substantive
issues. Id. at 99; see infra note 96 (addressing the danger that multimember districts
discriminate against groups with few voters). This argument ignores those multimem-
ber districts in which members of the same party may have to run against each other.
As members of the same party may be more similar to each other than to members of
the other party, it may be that multimember districts actually increase the role of
personalities in elections, whereas single-member districts, by forcing voters to choose
between one member of each party, increase the role of ideology and issues.
79 GuINIER, supra note 4, at 85.
80 Id. at 84.
81 Id. at 93.
82 For a discussion of the mathematics of a cumulative voting system, see id. at 15.
As a rule, the "exclusion threshold," i.e., the proportion of voters required to elect a
candidate in an election where n seats are available, is 1/(n+l). If only one candidate
can be elected, any candidate who receives more than 'h of the vote is automatically
elected because (1/(1+1))=1h. Of course, if more than two candidates are running, a
candidate can win with far less than 1h of the vote. For example, if four candidates can
be elected, anyone who gets more than 1/5 of the vote is automatically elected because
(1/(1+4)=/s). Id.
83 See, e.g., Dillard v. Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 870, 871 (M.D.
Ala. 1988) (approving the settlement of a Voting Rights Act suit that provided for
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cumulative voting in elections for corporate boards of directors.84
As Guinier sees it, cumulative voting offers the major advantage of
allowing minority groups to "vote strategically to win representation,"85
even in places in which the minority is "too geographically dispersed for a
districting plan to result in many, if any, 'majority minority' districts."8
For example, in 1987, the city of Alamogordo, New Mexico adopted
cumulative voting in order to settle a Voting Rights Act suit. Although
Latinos constituted twenty-one percent of the city's voting age popula-
tion,87 the city's at-large voting system had prevented any Latinos from
being elected to the city council between 1968 and 1987.88 Under the
city's cumulative voting scheme, voters could cast up to three votes for
any one candidate, and could elect three at-large council members. In
the first election held under the cumulative voting system, a Latina fin-
ished third and therefore won a council seat.89 The Latina won primarily
because the majority of Latino voters gave her overwhelming support,
casting an average of 2.6 votes apiece of a possible three for her.9 0 The
Alamogordo example suggests that cumulative voting can increase
minority representation, and that despite the apparent complexity of
cumulative voting, voters are intelligent enough to understand cumulative
voting and to cast multiple votes for their favorite candidates. 1
cumulative voting), aff'd mem., 868 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir. 1989). Guinier notes that
before the settlement, Chilton County's school board and commission were monopo-
lized by white Democrats. GUINIER, supra note 4, at 16. By contrast, each body now
includes blacks and Republicans. Id.
84 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that 30 states either require or permit cor-
porate cumulative voting); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Inves-
tors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 145-46 (1994)
(observing that although few states mandate corporate cumulative voting, only Mas-
sachusetts forbids it).
85 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 15.
86 Richard L. Engstrom et al., Cumulative Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote
Dilution: The Case of Alamogordo, New Mexico, 5 J.L. & POL. 469, 471 (1989); cf.
Gordon, supra note 84, at 127 (describing corporate cumulative voting as a vehicle for
increasing representation of significant minority factions among shareholders).
87 Engstrom et al., supra note 86, at 481.
88 Id. at 489.
89 Id. at 488.
90 Id. at 495.
91 Cf. ENID LAKEMAN, How DEMOCRACIES VOTE 143-50 (1970) (noting that no
country using any of a variety of different and complicated alternative voting systems
has ever abandoned its system because it was too difficult for voters to understand);
Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful Vote Dilution, 92 YALE
L.J. 144, 155-56 (1982) (acknowledging that one argument against cumulative voting
is that "[ilts complexity could present special problems to members of minority
groups, who are often less familiar with the voting process and tend to have less for-
mal education," but noting that "experience with at-large voting . . . suggests that
minority groups may be able to overcome this difficulty"). Guinier writes that fears
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Guinier points out that cumulative voting has several other advantages.
First, by allowing candidates to win with less than half of the total votes
cast, cumulative voting reduces the number of votes "wasted" on losing
candidates.92 Second, cumulative voting encourages black representation
without precluding multiracial coalitions. For example, Guinier explains
that "the single-member districting approach may require submerging ...
white Democratic voters within majority-white Republican districts."93
In contrast, cumulative voting may encourage multiracial coalitions by
allowing blacks to strike bargains with whites-for example, by agreeing
to cast some votes for blacks and others for sympathetic whites.94 Third,
cumulative voting, like other at-large systems, would eliminate gerryman-
dering by eliminating redistricting.9" Fourth, Guinier argues that cam-
paigns will become more oriented toward issues and more responsive to
the policy concerns of the electorate.96 Fifth, cumulative voting "avoids
the resentment of race-conscious districting among groups that are not
protected under the Voting Rights Act"97 by eliminating the sub-
mergence of whites-or non-black ethnic minorities-in majority-black
districts.
Guinier also rebuts what she considers the major argument against
cumulative voting: that cumulative voting creates a "proliferation of
political interest constituencies [that] may undermine consensus, exacer-
bate tension, and destabilize the political system."9" To Guinier, for
of cumulative voting's complexity are "overstated," particularly in light of the signifi-
cant advantages cumulative voting affords minority communities. GUINIER, supra
note 4, at 152.
92 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 14-15.
93 Id. at 95.
94 Id. at 96-97. For example, Alamogordo, New Mexico, elected its first-ever
Latina council member in the city's first election after the implementation of a cumu-
lative voting system. Despite overwhelming support in the Latino community, she
could not have won without significant non-Latino white "crossover" support. Eng-
strom et al., supra note 86, at 493.
95 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 152. Of course, it could be argued that this aspect of
cumulative voting disadvantages "communities with large numbers of noncitizens,
age-ineligible citizens," or other non-voters. Id. at 154. Guinier responds that cumu-
lative voting allows non-voters to protect their interests because it increases the
number of competitive elections, thereby encouraging forms of political participation
other than voting. Id. at 155. Guinier also notes that even under a cumulative voting
system, some districting may be required both for large governmental bodies such as
big-city councils and state legislatures, id. at 154-55, and so that "representatives [will]
have a local constituency for whom they are responsible without regard to who actu-
ally voted for them," id. at 155.
96 Id. at 99.
97 Id. at 100.
98 Id. at 153. This argument has also been made in the context of cumulative vot-
ing in corporate board elections. Cf. Gordon, supra note 84, at 150-53, 160-65 (noting
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whom "exclusiveness is a greater evil than controversy,"9 9 any system
that shuts minorities out to create consensus is a failure because it merely
camouflages conflict instead of eliminating it. Guinier could also note
(but does not) that race-conscious districting, by making legislatures
more diverse, may create as much conflict and fragmentation as cumula-
tive voting.
3. Flaws in Guinier's Discussion of Cumulative Voting
Guinier's discussion of cumulative voting suffers from three major
flaws. First, she offers no details as to why cumulative voting is prefera-
ble to other semi-proportional electoral systems, such as "pure propor-
tional representation" or the "single transferable vote" ("STV").
Under a pure proportional representation system, voters cast ballots
for a single list of candidates affiliated with a single political party. The
parties are then represented in a legislature in the same proportion of
votes they receive in the general election.' 00 Guinier's failure to explain
fully the inadequacies of pure proportional representation is puzzling,
especially because she raises several points that suggest that pure propor-
tional representation inadequately serves her purposes. For example,
Guinier stresses that under a cumulative voting system, the exclusion
threshold can be set be high enough to eliminate extremist groups.' 0 ' In
some proportional representation systems, however, the exclusion thresh-
old falls as low as one percent. 0 2 Guinier also notes that cumulative vot-
ing permits recognition of intense minority preferences by allowing
multiple votes to be cast for single candidates.0" By contrast, pure pro-
that some commentators oppose cumulative voting in corporate settings because it
increases battles for corporate control and reduces harmony and mutual respect
within corporations). Corporate cumulative voting, however, does not necessarily
provide the best vehicle for evaluating cumulative legislative elections. Opponents of
corporate cumulative voting argue that it turns a corporate board into "a debating
forum," id. at 167, and causes the election of " 'directors who are by their nature
partisans of particular interest groups,'" id. (quoting Charles M. Williams, Cumula-
tive Voting, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1955, at 108, 112). Legislatures, on the other
hand, should be debating fora, and should include partisans of different interests. The
principal policy in favor of cumulative voting in legislative elections-the prevention
of "tyranny of the majority"-is less important in the corporate realm, because large
public firms usually have no majority shareholder who can dominate other sharehold-
ers, and because all shareholders "are ordinarily assumed to share the same goal-the
maximization of share price." Id. at 168-69, 169 n.143.
99 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 153.
100 See Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33
UCLA L. REV. 77, 161-62 (describing the operation of proportional representation
schemes as an alternative to single-member, plurality-based districting).
101 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 99.
102 Id. at 261 n.126.
103 Id. at 95.
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portional representation allows voters only one vote. On the other hand,
pure proportional representation does eliminate gerrymandering because
it allows jurisdiction-wide voting even in large districts. By contrast,
cumulative voting may require multimember districting in large states
and localities to prevent voters from having to choose among an unwieldy
number of candidates."0 4
STV is another alternative to cumulative voting. Under STV, voters
list all candidates running for office in order of preference. Once a
voter's first choice has received a sufficient number of votes to be elected,
his or her vote is transferred to the next-choice candidate who has not yet
received a sufficient percentage of the vote to be elected.'0 5 Guinier does
not provide a sufficient explanation for favoring cumulative voting over
STV.
Second, Guinier fails to clarify when the law requires cumulative voting
or which circumstances suggest that cumulative voting would be appro-
priate. Initially, she notes that the fairness of a voting system should not
be legally relevant unless "a black interest agenda consistently differs
from the mainstream emphasis of white working- or middle-class repre-
sentation."'0 6 However, she also suggests that such polarization should
be easy to prove, because "blacks, wherever they reside, tend to be politi-
cally cohesive .... Even disagreements among blacks pale by compari-
son with the differences in political interest and philosophy between
blacks and whites."'0 7 Where racial polarization exists, Guinier calls on
courts to "assess the fairness of the at-large system against the potential
representativeness" of cumulative voting.'0 8 Indeed, as at-large systems
usually shut minorities out of the political process,'0 9 cumulative voting
would usually elect more minorities than at-large systems. In sum,
Guinier's logic suggests that she thinks cumulative voting is always pref-
erable to traditional winner-take-all at-large systems.
On the other hand, Guinier does not consider cumulative voting a
"panacea" that "should be imposed on nonconsenting jurisdictions
nationwide."' 0 Guinier makes her argument even more confusing by
104 In addition, pure proportional representation with low exclusionary thresholds
may help eliminate the wasted-vote phenomenon Guinier discusses throughout her
book.
105 Enid Lakeman, Choosing an Electoral System, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL
SYSTEM 44-45 (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984) (outlining the
mechanics of STV). See generally Grofman, supra note 100, at 162-70 (discussing
various alternative voting schemes that have been used in the United States, including
STY).
106 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 98.
107 Id. (endnote omitted).
108 Id. at 94.
109 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
110 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 277 n.74.
1994]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:927
failing to explain when cumulative voting should be imposed in areas with
single-member districting systems. If, as Guinier suggests, cumulative
voting always represents minorities more effectively than single-member
systems because it reduces the number of "wasted votes," why shouldn't
cumulative voting be imposed in all areas with single-member districting?
Unfortunately, Guinier never addresses this issue directly.
Third, Guinier has not fully examined those cumulative voting systems
that have actually been implemented. She does note that some corpora-
tions and rural county commissions have recently adopted cumulative
voting."' However, she ignores Illinois's lengthy experiment with this
system. Between 1872 and 1980, Illinois used cumulative voting to elect
the lower house of its legislature." 2 Under the now-abandoned Illinois
system, voters received three votes to distribute among the three candi-
dates running in their district. Voters could distribute these votes in any
manner they saw fit." 3
The vices of the Illinois system indicate that cumulative voting may be
more appropriate in some situations than in others. For example, cumu-
lative voting-or any other scheme involving multimember districts-
would require a large state either to make the legislature unusually large,
as happened in Illinois, or to create unacceptably large legislative dis-
tricts." 4 By contrast, a rural city council would not face this problem,
because a city with 2000 people presumably would not require as many
districts or legislators as a state with two million people.
Cumulative voting also creates special problems in partisan elections.
Suppose that each party nominates four candidates in a four-member leg-
islative district. If every party member votes the straight party line, the
majority party will win all four seats, thus wasting minority party mem-
bers' votes, and defeating the purpose of cumulative voting. 115 In fact, to
obtain any seats at all, minority party legislative candidates would be
forced either to campaign against each other by asking their own party's
voters to cast all their votes for one candidate," 6 or to ask the other
party's voters to "cross over" and cast one vote for a minority party can-
"' Id. at 15.
112 See Engstrom et al., supra note 86, at 476 n.38 (noting that Illinois eliminated
cumulative voting as a side effect of reducing the size of its state legislature, rather
than out of concern over the effects of cumulative voting); Charles W. Dunn, Cumula-
tive Voting Problems in Illinois Legislative Elections, 9 HARV. J. LEGms. 627, 628
(1972) (calling for the abolition of cumulative voting in favor of a single-member
system).
113 Dunn, supra note 112, at 627.
114 See id. at 643-46 (describing how cumulative voting can lead to legislative bod-
ies so large as to preclude effective deliberation of issues).
115 Id. at 662-63 (predicting that a minority party could be shut out of representing
a district altogether if it were required to nominate one candidate for every seat).
116 Such intra-party warfare occasionally occurred in Illinois when the minority
party nominated more than one candidate per district. Id. at 648-49.
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didate. Thus, cumulative voting in partisan elections creates a substantial
risk of collusion between the parties." 7
Arguably, a state could limit these problems by allowing parties to limit
the number of candidates they nominated. If, however, parties nomi-
nated fewer candidates than seats, electoral competition might be virtu-
ally eliminated. For many years, Illinois allowed parties to limit the
number of candidates nominated under its cumulative voting system. As
a result, the minority party typically would nominate only one candidate
in a three-member district." 8 Under these circumstances, cumulative
voting could actually serve to reduce, rather than increase, electoral com-
petition. In nonpartisan elections, however, cumulative voting might spur
competition, because the parties could not limit the number of effective
candidates through their control over the nomination process.
In sum, Guinier's discussion of cumulative voting is interesting but
inadequate. Although she persuasively explains the virtues of cumulative
voting, she fails to explain fully: (1) when cumulative voting is appropri-
ate; and (2) how to avoid the drawbacks of the Illinois system.
C. Guinier on Legislative Decisionmaking
Guinier's most controversial ideas involve her solutions to racial polari-
zation in legislative decisionmaking. One conservative activist accuses
Guinier of "demand[ing] equal legislative outcomes, requiring abandon-
ment not only of the 'one person, one vote' principle, but of majority rule
itself.""' 9 Indeed, Guinier does question the fairness of majority rule,
even where racial minorities are proportionately represented in the legis-
lature. But the accusation at the time of her nomination that Guinier was
a "quota queen" is misleading because she believes that quotas inade-
quately remedy the problem of minority underrepresentation.
120
Guinier contends that "[wihere decisions are made by a simple major-
117 Obviously, these problems would not come up in a city with non-partisan
elections.
118 Id. at 646. Dunn notes that in 1776 district elections between 1902 and 1979,
only 17 districts ever had as many as five candidates-e.g., three majority-party and
two minority-party candidates-competing for the three available legislative seats.
119 Clint Bolick, Showdown over Civil Rights, L.A. DAILY J., June 2, 1993, at 6.
120 Guinier claims that she "has never been in favor of quotas," GUINIER, supra
note 4, at 189, but she also says that the Senate should encourage "diversity in the
[judicial] appointment process by withholding its advice and consent until enough
nominations have been made to establish a pattern of 'affirmative recruitment,' " id.
at 39. For example, she suggests that the Senate Judiciary Committee "could decline
to consider any nominee until a sufficient number of nominations-such as twenty or
thirty-were made so as to enable the Committee to consider ... the impact of these
twenty or thirty nominations as a totality on the composition of the federal bench."
Id. Because Guinier's scheme sounds suspiciously quota-like, one must conclude that
her definition of a "quota" is quite narrow.
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ity vote, deliberation may be incomplete and less inclusive of minority
viewpoints."'' Black elected officials in such circumstances may fail to
generate cross-racial alliances. As Guinier notes, for example, a black
elected to a city council operating by majority vote may be isolated and
ignored.'22 Additionally, she states that white legislators in those circum-
stances occasionally go out of their way to ignore minority legislators.'23
According to Guinier, the result of winner-take-all democracy is insti-
tutionalized unfairness-because one group of legislators is always out-
voted, it never has the opportunity to present its ideas.' 24 By extension,
pure majority rule fails to protect the interests of racial and ethnic minor-
ities, because "[v]oting is not just about winning elections. . . .People
participate in politics to have their ideas and interests represented, not
simply to win contested seats.' 1 25 In Guinier's vision of a fair system, "all
voters [have] an equal opportunity to be part of the winning coalition....
A permanent majority should not exercise all the power and a permanent
minority should not always lose.
' 126
Guinier thus wants legislatures to operate according to the "propor-
tionality principle""'2 -51 percent of the voters should not possess 100
percent of the power. Of course, Guinier recognizes that the "propor-
tionality principle," if applied consistently, would make government
unmanageable. Instead, she suggests that majority rule should only be
limited where racial polarization exists, because only racial minorities
"have succeeded in making a strong, historically supported and congres-
sionally mandated case for their claims that a homogenous, permanent
majority has exercised disproportionate power consistently.' 12 Guinier
dismisses concerns about the effect such remedies would have on groups
other than racial majorities: "other groups need not resent interest repre-
sentation claims, for once a violation is found, the remedy does not disad-
vantage them, and indeed, advantages them to the extent that they are
politically cohesive and sufficiently numerous."'
129
Guinier's remedy for majority tyranny involves "restructuring the legis-
121 Id. at 63.
122 Id. at 64.
123 Guinier cites a Texas school board that changed its rules for placing items on
the agenda after the town elected a Mexican-American member to the board. Prior
to the Mexican-American's election, any board member could put an item on the
agenda, but afterward issues would be considered only if another member seconded
the motion. Id. at 75.
124 It is worth noting that race is not the only factor that may polarize a legislative
body. A minority bloc in an ideologically polarized legislature may be outvoted as
consistently by the majority as a racial minority.
125 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 93.
126 Id. at 92.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 110.
129 Id.
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lative decisionmaking process on the model of jury deliberations.., by
imposing voting rules that reduce the number of up and down-votes," and
thereby inviting meaningful consensus. 3 Specifically, Guinier recom-
mends: (1) cumulative voting in legislatures; and (2) some form of veto
power for minorities.
I shall address these remedies first, and then proceed to constitutional
concerns.
1. Cumulative Voting
When evidence demonstrates that minority legislators have little influ-
ence, Guinier suggests that "one innovative and potentially transforma-
tive remedial measure would be to reproduce within the council a
cumulative voting process," in which "over a period of time and a series
of legislative proposals, votes on multiple bills would be aggregated or
linked."'' Guinier seems to envision a system in which a black legislator
might have one vote to cast on each of five bills, and could cast all five for
the bill that interested him most-much like voters in a cumulative voting
jurisdiction either cast numerous votes for one candidate or disperse
them among multiple candidates. The practical result of this proposal
would be to give small blocs of legislators near-absolute power over
issues they care about.
Guinier's claim that legislative cumulative voting would be "innova-
tive"' 32 is a radical understatement. Throughout her book, she empha-
sizes the virtues of consensus, and yet under her proposal for cumulative
legislative voting, a small number of legislators could effectively pass a
law. Thus, cumulative legislative voting might exchange "tyranny of the
majority" for "tyranny of the minority.'
' 33
The only justification for such a scheme would be that intense minori-
ties are somehow wiser about their own group's needs than disorganized
majorities. However, an intense minority's interest may often be adverse
to those of an ever-apathetic majority. For example, during the 1980s, the
savings and loan ("S&L") industry persuaded Congress to enact legisla-
tion that enabled S&L's to engage in risky investments. The risky invest-
ments caused many S&L's to become insolvent, and eventually through
federal deposit insurance, cost taxpayers hundreds of billions of dol-
lars.134 Further, as Stephen Carter's foreword to Guinier's book recog-
nizes, organized minorities of all political stripes often get their way, even
130 Id. at 107.
13' Id. at 107-08.
132 Id. at 107.
133 By contrast, cumulative voting in elections is far less radical. Even if 10% of
the voters elect an extremist or two, the extremists would be outvoted in the
legislature.
134 For a very brief explanation of the S&L fiasco, see BARONE & UJIFUSA, supra
note 28, at 475-76. In addition, numerous books have been devoted to the subject.
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without cumulative voting.135  Cumulative voting could exacerbate the
problem of special interest domination by enabling a few legislators to
pass laws merely by "cumulating" their votes on issues in which they-or
the wealthiest contributors to their campaigns-were especially
interested.
Indeed, if all legislators could cumulate their votes, a small bloc of leg-
islators could get their way merely by persuading the rest of the legisla-
tors to abstain from voting, rather than embarking upon the more
difficult task of persuading the majority to endorse the organized minor-
ity's pet projects. For example, the majority of legislators might be suffi-
ciently apathetic to abstain from voting on the minority's pet projects in
return for the minority's abstention from voting on the majority's pet
projects. Thus, black legislators could pass a bill paying people to dig
ditches in black neighborhoods, while white legislators could pass a sepa-
rate bill doing the same for whites-yet neither group would be blamed
for pork-barreling, because cumulative voting allows each group to
abstain from voting on the other's bill and to cast multiple votes in favor
of its own bill.
Of course, one could limit cumulative voting to minority legislators.
However, cumulative voting by minority legislators raises the same spe-
cial interest domination problems as legislature-wide cumulative voting,
and raises a number of other difficult questions about implementation.
For example, who would be a "minority legislator" under such a scheme?
Are all blacks minority legislators, or is it necessary to make further dis-
tinctions, such as between liberal and conservative blacks, or among legis-
lators born of interracial marriages? Do other cohesive groups, such as
Hasidic Jews, deserve minority legislator status? These questions demon-
strate that the dangers of legislative cumulative voting are matched by the
difficulty of implementing such a scheme.
2. Supermajority Votes and Minority Vetoes
Guinier also suggests "a supermajority vote on issues of importance to
the majority or its equivalent, a minority veto on critical minority
issues.' ' 136 Because it gives minorities mere veto power over legislation,
See, e.g., MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY (1990) (tracing
thoroughly the S&L crisis, including Congress's role).
135 Stephen Carter, Foreword to GUINIER, supra note 4, at xvi-xvii ("Conservatives
like to point to strong majorities who support school choice plans and term limits but
are unable to get even a vote in the Congress. Liberals counter with citations to the
equally strong majorities who support gun control and federal funding for abortion.").
I note that at the national level, racial minorities can actually benefit from such
special-interest domination. For example, the "civil rights" lobbies helped persuade
Congress to pass the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 and the Civil Rights Act
of 1991.
136 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 108.
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as opposed to empowering them to enact "special interest" laws, the
supermajority voting proposal is far less radical than legislative cumula-
tive voting.'1
7
As an example of situations in which such special protection may be
appropriate, imagine a situation in which two ethnic groups are so
divided that if either group could pass legislation on its own without
obstruction, the other group would be oppressed. Even Guinier's many
critics implicitly conceded this point by suggesting that her proposals
were appropriate for foreign countries which had recently experienced
ethnic civil wars.' 38 However, it does not follow that such rules are
appropriate in the United States.
3. When Should Legislatures Be Reformed?
Even if the current system of winner-take-all majority rule is unfair, it
might not be illegal. Guinier equivocates on the question of whether a
legislature's failure to address polarization within its ranks violates the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. In one passage, Guinier states that "imper-
missible vote dilution should be defined by comparison to a fair voting
system in which: (1) neither the majority nor the minority always domi-
nates; (2) each voter has an equal opportunity to cast a 'meaningful vote';
and (3) the decisional rules use principles of proportional power to
induce consensual approaches to problem solving."' 39 More specifically,
she states that "statutory voting rights cases could measure deviations
from an ideal proportional power share to determine gross interest repre-
sentation disparities."'
140
Read in isolation, these passages suggest that majority rule within a
legislature should be illegal whenever a racial minority has less than a
"proportional power share.' 14 1 Yet a few pages later, Guinier stresses
137 Of course, supermajority rules may raise the same problems as legislative
cumulative voting. It may be difficult to define "minority legislator," and nearly
impossible to define "critical minority issues."
'38 See Paul Gigot, Potomac Watch, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1993, at A14 (suggesting
that Guinier's views are better suited to nations such as Bosnia, "where ethnic and
racial tensions are extreme enough to require extreme minority protections," than to
the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department); see also GUINIER, supra note 4,
at 18 (citing Lally Weymouth's endorsement of special protections for South African
whites as an example of an "acceptable" limitation on majority rule).
139 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 106.
140 Id.
141 The "proportional power share" concept seems quite unclear. How does one
determine what constitutes a "proportional power share?" Does one simply tally up
all votes-including issues of little racial significance-and figure out how often the
majority of the legislature agreed with the majority of non-white legislators? This rule
would encourage legislators to force votes on issues merely to show racial polarization
or the absence of racial polarization.
If only "racial" issues will be considered, what constitutes a "racial" issue? Even if
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that her proposals are neither "statutorily or constitutionally required,"
and are "wholly exploratory suggestions" limited "to the specific context
of a remedial approach to extreme cases of racial discrimination at the
local level."' 42 Thus, Guinier fails to make it clear whether white domi-
nation of a legislature is: (1) itself a Voting Rights Act violation; (2) evi-
dence of such a violation; or (3) a factor that courts should consider in
framing remedies once a violation has been found.
143
Assuming that supermajority rules and cumulative voting merely rem-
edy independent Voting Rights Act violations, Guinier still fails to clarify
when she believes such remedies should be adopted. Even if she feels
such rules become appropriate only in extreme cases of racial discrimina-
tion, Guinier still does not specify what differentiates an "extreme case of
racial discrimination" from an ordinary voting rights violation.'"
One could argue that line-drawing concerns are irrelevant, and that
legislative rules must err on the side of promoting consensus rather than
winner-take-all majority rule because of the importance of achieving con-
sensus on racial issues. Consensus, however, has costs. Over most of the
past quarter-century, control of the federal government has been split
between a Republican president and a Democratic legislature. This polit-
ical split has often required some level of bipartisan consensus to pass
major legislation, enabling both liberals and conservatives to blame the
federal government for the nation's problems: Liberals have blamed the
Republicans in office, while conservatives have blamed the Democrats.
Voters, of course, do not know whom to blame. Would a government
dominated by one party have done any better over the past 25 years?
Perhaps not, but if "one-party" government were the rule rather than the
exception, the dominant party could implement its philosophy and voters
could hold it accountable. Where government by consensus prevails, no
one need accept responsibility or blame for the status quo.
145
Of course, concerns about accountability become more relevant in
some settings than others. In national and, to a lesser extent, state and
there were some logical way to identify racial issues, not all votes on racial issues are
the same. If, for example, a legislature holds 10 votes on bills "advancing" black
interests, such as strengthening civil rights laws, blacks are helped by the legislature
even if they "win" only once or twice. On the other hand, if the legislature holds 10
votes on bills "impairing" black interests, such as measures to repeal civil rights laws,
blacks lose even if they win 9 times out of 10. Therefore, statistics showing a "black
win percentage" may not reflect the political strength of black legislators.
142 GUININR, supra note 4, at 109.
143 See id. at 105-09 (discussing the rights and remedies that voting rights law
should guarantee).
144 Id. at 109.
145 See, e.g., Fred Barnes, White House Watch: The Tilt, NEW REPUBLIC, June 6,
1994, at 10, 11 (stating that Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell "destroy[ed]"
George Bush's presidency because he "stymied Bush across the board, blocking every
economic growth measure").
GUINIERIAN RADICALISM?
big-city government, elections often focus on ideological differences.
Thus, to some extent politics will be a "search for truth": Voters worried
about a few major problems, such as crime and the economy, will have to
decide who is best qualified to solve these problems. Even in cases of
temporary racial polarization, groups can collectively "change their
minds" after seeing governments succeed or fail in dealing with major
issues. It may therefore be preferable for state and national governments
to vest a disproportionate amount of power in the dominant party-so
that it may be held accountable on Election Day.
By contrast, in a nonpartisan, small-town local government, issues like
crime and the economy will often be of little relevance, because such
problems are mostly statewide or national in nature. Local politics may
primarily concern personalities, or division of tax revenues among
groups. In such a polity, political differentiation relates only to who
should be elected, or about how to divide government resources among
groups-e.g., black neighborhoods versus white neighborhoods. Voters
may display largely immutable preferences in small-town politics; other
things being equal, voters usually prefer to redistribute resources to their
own neighborhoods, or prefer candidates of their own race. Voters in
such towns will not change their preferences in reaction to governmental
error, which means there is no reason to give a faction disproportionate
power for the purpose of helping voters determine their preferences. It
follows that in a nonideological, local governmental body, the case for
consensus is far stronger, and the case for majority rule far weaker, than
in Congress, a state legislature, or even a big-city council.
Guinier is not completely oblivious to this distinction. She suggests
"fashioning local councils in the image of the ideal, consensus-driven
jury.' 146 However, she fails to explore the difference between state and
local governments, and does not discuss what makes a consensus-driven
legislature more appropriate for some local councils than for others.
147
For example, a partisan city council located in a large city may resemble a
state legislature more than it resembles a small-town county commission:
The big-city council may have to deal with major social problems, and
may have parties or ideological factions which could be held collectively
accountable for governmental failure.
D. Constitutional Concerns
Guinier makes sure to state that her remedies will withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny. First, she argues that federalism and separation of powers
concerns would not restrict the federal government's ability to remedy
146 GUINIER, supra note 4, at 107 (emphasis added); see also id. at 17 ("It was
never my intent that supermajority requirements should be the norm for all legislative
bodies ... ")
147 Id. at 107-09.
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racial polarization, because the Supreme Court has already recognized
that the "extraordinarily intrusive" remedies that Congress has fashioned
pursuant to the Voting Rights Act have been "necessary and appropriate
to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution.'
148
Guinier also notes that her remedies do not affect the "one person, one
vote" doctrine. 149 Because cumulative voting aims to ensure "that each
voter exercises a similarly meaningful vote" while supermajority vetoes
look "to ensure each voter an equal opportunity to influence the poli-
cymaking process," each serves permissible goals.' 50  Further,
supermajority rules are hardly unknown in American politics,' 5 ' and have
survived the scrutiny of the Supreme Court.
152
CONCLUSION
Had the Senate been given the opportunity to vote on Guinier's confir-
mation, it would have been forced to decide whether Guinier was a dan-
gerous radical or a "mainstream pro-integrationist". 53 As I have
discussed in this Review, cumulative voting in elections and even
supermajority rules may be appropriate in some situations, but they
should probably not be used in state legislatures or in the United States
Congress. Thus, to determine how radical Guinier's proposals were, a
reasonable senator would need to learn whether Guinier's ideas were
intended as extraordinary remedies for bizarre situations, or as "normal"
remedies which a Guinier-led Civil Rights Division would encourage
whenever the Division sensed racial polarization in the air.
148 Id. at 115. Thus, state court cases addressing the constitutionality of cumulative
voting for state legislatures miss the point. See Grofman, supra note 100, at 165
nn.363-64 (noting that state courts have split on the constitutionality of cumulative
voting).
149 GuINIER, supra note 4, at 116.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 17 (citing examples).
152 E.g., Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971). In Gordon, the Court upheld West
Virginia's requirement that 60% of the voters in a statewide referendum approve pro-
posals for bond issuance and tax increases. Id. at 7. Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Burger stated that "[t]here is nothing in the language of the Constitution, or
history, or our cases that requires that a majority always prevail on every issue." Id.
at 6. In two other noteworthy cases, federal district courts have upheld the constitu-
tionality of cumulative voting. See Dillard v. Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 699 F.
Supp. 870, 875 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (stating, but not discussing, that "[t]here is nothing in
federal constitutional or statutory law that prohibits" cumulative voting in local elec-
tions), aff'd mem., 868 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir. 1989); Skolnick v. Illinois State Electoral
Bd., 307 F. Supp. 691, 698 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (finding that cumulative voting in the Illi-
nois House of Representatives did not violate the Constitution's equal protection
provisions).
153 William T. Coleman, Jr., Three's Company: Guinier, Reagan, Bush, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 1993, at A31.
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Unfortunately, though understandably given the novelty of her ideas,
Guinier's writings never clearly state when, if ever, the Justice Depart-
ment should pressure state and local governments to adopt cumulative
voting or supermajority rules. This makes it unclear how radical a
Guinier-led Civil Rights Division would have been, or whether a Guinier-
led Civil Rights Division would require any more of state and local gov-
ernments than a Civil Rights Division led by another Clinton appointee.
The Tyranny of the Majority may indeed spark the debate that Americans
missed out on when President Clinton withdrew Guinier's nomination,
but, unfortunately, a large portion of that debate will focus on trying to
figure out what Guinier's writings really mean.

